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AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW OF JURY SELECTION
FOR ARKANSAS CRIMINAL TRIAL LAWYERS
J. Thomas Sullivan*
Trial lawyers recognize voir dire as a critical element in both jury
selection and development of the case because it represents the only
opportunity during trial for counsel to engage in a dialogue with pro-
spective jurors as a group and individually. While counsel may address
the jury in both opening and closing argument and the testimony will
necessarily be directed toward the jury during presentation of the case
and defense, these situations neither permit direct response from jurors,
nor do they allow counsel to communicate prior to the use of challenges
or peremptory strikes in shaping the composition of the final body
which will sit in judgment at trial.
Typically, voir dire serves a number of discrete functions for both
sides in the criminal trial. First, it permits counsel for both the State
and the defense to establish a personal presence in the courtroom and
in the minds of individual jurors.1 For the defense, it allows counsel to
initiate the process of humanizing the accused to the jurors. This pro-
cess is considered critical in major prosecutions in which the sensa-
tional or grotesque nature of the crime demand that all potentially
favorable impressions of the accused be fully developed in order to off-
set the jury prejudice which might, unchecked, bring about an unfair
conviction or overly harsh sentence.2
* Associate Professor of Law University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. Copy-
right, 1992, by the Author. This article was originally prepared for presentation at the continuing
legal education seminar "Jury Selection in Criminal Cases," sponsored by the UALR Criminal
Law Association on April 11, 1992 in Little Rock. The author expresses his appreciation to James
S. Howard, UALR '92 and first president of the Criminal Law Association, for his splendid re-
search assistance. Mr. Howard currently practices with Parrish & Kruidenier, Des Monies, Iowa.
1. However, in Van Cleave v. State, 268 Ark. 514, 518, 598 S.W.2d 65, 67 (1980), the
Arkansas Supreme Court observed that voir dire is not an occasion for counsel to simply "get
acquainted" with the jurors, nor are counsel free to conduct the examination "in any and all
directions for as long as they desire." There, the court concluded that the defense strategy of
relying on a plea of not guilty, rather than advancing a specific defense or affirmative defense,
justified the trial court's limitation on defense counsel's questioning of the venire.
2. See generally, Dennis N. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13
AKRON L. REV. 331, 356-57 (1979) (emphasizing need for counsel to develop strategy for "hu-
manizing" capital defendants to jury); J. Thomas Sullivan, Use of the "Zola Plea" in New Jersey
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Second, voir dire permits counsel to develop theories of the case
and explain elements of offenses and defenses as a means of testing
juror understanding of the nature of the jury function in evaluating
evidence and reaching a decision during the guilt or innocence phase of
trial. This is particularly important when prospective jurors are subject
to challenge for cause because of prior exposure to facts or biases
which effectively exclude them from serving as fair and impartial ju-
rors.' Similarly, jurors categorically rejecting theories of either the of-
fense or defense-such as the prospective juror who could not convict
for mere possession of marijuana or who rejects any claim of self de-
fense in a "battered women" case--can be challenged for cause." Also,
voir dire affords counsel an opportunity to identify jurors subject to
disqualification as a matter of law, such as where the juror is disquali-
fied by virtue of blood relationship or affinity to a party or counsel. 5
Third, counsel are often able to use voir dire to successfully iden-
tify those jurors most likely to be receptive or hostile to counsel's posi-
tion at trial and exercise peremptories intelligently as a result of the
development of these perceptions.6 For example, a juror too likely to
Capital Prosecutions, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 3 (1990) and J. Thomas Sullivan, The Capital
Defendant's Right to Make a Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law Allocution and Constitu-
tional Mitigation, 15 N.M. L. REV. 41 (1985) (both focusing on opportunity for capital defendant
to address jury personally in sentencing phase to make plea for leniency).
3. For example, see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 1717 (1961), where the Court reversed a con-
viction when eight of twelve prospective jurors ultimately selected to serve admitted to a predispo-
sition to convict on extensive pre-trial publicity concerning the accused's confession to multiple
murders and burglaries and his offer to plead guilty. The Court concluded that their representa-
tions that they could, nevertheless, serve as fair jurors and render an impartial verdict were insuffi-
cient to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial where this expression of sentiment indicated a
"pattern of deep and bitter prejudice." However, in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975), the
Court apparently modified its earlier view in holding that no presumption of prejudice should be
drawn from juror exposure to publicity concerning the accused or the crime, even when that expo-
sure included disclosure of his prior convictions. Murphy demonstrates the need for counsel to
carefully develop the record of predisposition, prejudgment, or bias on the part of prospective
jurors in order to sustain a claim that failure to exclude such jurors for cause constitutes error.
4. For example, a juror who expects the defendant to testify in his own behalf despite the
constitutional protection against compelled testimony may typically be subject to disqualification
based on the juror's inability to follow the law and instructions of the trial court. See Bovee v.
State, 19 Ark. App. 268, 275, 720 S.W.2d 322, 325 (1986). Similarly, a juror's inability to con-
sider the complete range of possible penalties which may be imposed upon conviction will serve to
disqualify a juror. Haynes v. State, 270 Ark. 685, 692-93, 606 S.W.2d 563, 566 (1980).
5. See Mitchell v. Goodall, 297 Ark. 332, 333-34, 761 S.W.2d 919, 920 (1988) for a discus-
sion of disqualification based on familial relationship in the context of a civil trial pursuant to
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-31-102(b)(1).
6. The Arkansas Supreme Court has observed that the two purposes of voir dire are: (1) for
discovery of grounds for challenges for cause and (2) to permit disclosure of information which
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identify with the police may avoid being struck for cause by affirming
his or her willingness to consider the testimony of an officer with an
open mind.7 However, the process itself will necessarily suggest that the
juror be struck unless, of course, the accused is an officer, a situation
presenting a more complex set of variables in the peremptory challenge
decision.
Fourth, counsel are able to use preliminary questioning of prospec-
tive jurors to gain insight into juror thinking about issues even when an
absolute matter of disqualification is not in issue.8 Thus, in a case in-
volving an elderly person, inquiry into the status of parents of individ-
ual jurors may be valuable in assisting counsel in ascertaining which
jurors should be struck through exercise of peremptories and may also
afford an understanding of which of several alternative approaches in
the presentation of evidence and argument is more likely to be
successful.
Fifth, experienced counsel use voir dire to identify those jurors
who may be characterized as "strong" jurors, based on evidence of
likely leadership or decisionmaking potentia!, as distinguished from ju-
rors likely to be "weak," followers, or those more readily influenced.
Once isolated, jurors deemed dangerous to the party's position for
whatever reason may be subjected to exclusion by use of peremptories.
Finally, in a theatrical sense, experienced counsel use voir dire as
the opening act of the play, designed both to lay the foundation for the
will provide a basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges. Sanders v. State, 278 Ark. 420, 422,
646 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1983); accord Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1908 (1991).
7. For example, in Holland v. State, 260 Ark. 617, 618, 542 S.W.2d 761, 762 (1976), de-
fense counsel unsuccessfully sought to challenge a number of prospective jurors who had already
served at trials in which the prosecution had relied on the testimony of an undercover narcotics
officer who would be the State's key witness in the prosecution of the defendant for the sale of
marijuana. Defense counsel argued that these jurors had already developed a bias or predisposi-
tion crediting the testimony of this officer based on their prior service in other cases resulting in
conviction. The supreme court rejected the claim that the trial court erred in refusing to excuse
these jurors who otherwise demonstrated themselves to be impartial and qualified to serve. Never-
theless, the development of information relating to this prior service would be of extreme impor-
tance in the determination of which jurors should be removed through exercise of peremptory
strikes.
8. Identification of prospective jurors who have been or who identify themselves as victims
of crime, particularly offenses similar in nature to that to be tried, is of significance in the assign-
ment of peremptories because these jurors may be found qualified to serve despite their personal
experiences. See Linell v. State, 283 Ark. 162, 164, 671 S.W.2d 741, 742 (1984) (prospective
juror in capital case who disclosed that he had been victim of robbery and his family had been
targeted for acts of violence deemed qualified to serve by trial court based on representation that
he would disregard other exposure to criminal behavior because of serious nature of the case).
1992]
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case and to build the momentum for ultimate persuasion. A credible
voir dire--one which exposes and addresses biases of jurors honestly;
discloses weaknesses in counsel's case not as flaws to be feared, but as
simple components in a factually complex human situation; or serves to
pierce common misconceptions-challenges jurors to remain receptive
to evidence and fairminded in their assessments of witness credibility,
ensuring the accused a trial by a fair and impartial jury.'
In order to properly use voir dire to achieve the goals set forth in
the preceding paragraphs, counsel must understand first the legal
framework in which this investigation is conducted. Counsel may divide
on the issues of subjective bases for picking juries or the use of scien-
tific jury selection methods, but regardless of the mode of investigation
undertaken, counsel must conduct the examination within the accept-
able parameters defined by caselaw, statutory provisions, and proce-
dural rules. The purpose of this article is to present a simple legal
framework for understanding those parameters for practitioners in cir-
cuit and federal district courts in Arkansas.
I. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
While most practitioners would likely view voir dire as a tradi-
tional aspect of trial procedure now controlled by state law and rules of
practice, in fact, the United States Supreme Court has exercised dra-
matic influence on the shape of voir dire both in terms of its rule-mak-
ing role in controlling federal trial procedure and in terms of discerning
constitutional requirements for the proper conduct of jury selection.
A. The Court's Role in Regulating Voir Dire
Regarding the latter consideration, the simple rule is that the
Court has authorized federal courts to exercise considerable discretion
in controlling voir dire, flowing from its general statement of the rule in
Connors v. United States, in which Justice Harlan wrote:
It is quite true, as suggested by the accused, that he was entitled to be
9. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .. " The
corresponding guarantee afforded by the Arkansas Constitution, article 2, section 10, couches the
right in similar language, substituting the phrase "the county in which the crime shall have been
committed" for the "state and district" language of the national document. It also specifically
permits the transfer of causes to any other county within the judicial district upon motion of the
accused.
[Vol. 15:37
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tried by an impartial jury, that is, by jurors who had no bias or
prejudice that would prevent them from returning a verdict according
to the law and evidence. It is equally true that a suitable inquiry is
permissible in order to ascertain whether the juror has any bias, opin-
ion, or prejudice that would affect or control the fair determination by
him of the issues to be tried. That inquiry is conducted under the
supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to
its sound discretion. This is the rule in civil cases, and the same rule
must be applied in criminal cases.10
Following this principle, the Court has vested discretion in the district
courts for the conduct of the examination of prospective jurors.11 Quali-
fications of jurors for federal trials are set by statute.
1 2
Federal trial judges may follow essentially three approaches in
controlling the voir dire examination. First, the trial court may permit
counsel to conduct the examination on behalf of their respective par-
ties. Second, the court may simply conduct the entire examination. In
the event the court does elect to conduct the examination, it may em-
ploy a third approach, permitting counsel to either supplement the
court's examination or propound additional questions to prospective ju-
rors specifically requested by counsel."3
While there may be merits to the system whereby the trial court
either totally controls voir dire or permits supplementation of its pres-
entation With inquiry suggested by counsel, the obvious drawback to
any system of court-conducted voir dire is that counsel's exercise of
important and often hard-won trial skills is subordinated to the oft-
cited preference for judicial economy. Moreover, this may prove a sub-
10. 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895). Employing similar reasoning, the court in Murphy v. United
States, 7 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1831) concluded that the accused had no right to have counsel person-
ally conduct the voir dire examination, holding that the decision on the conduct of the examina-
tion itself is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) provides:
The court may permit the defendant or the defendant's attorney and the attorney
for the government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself con-
duct the examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the defendant or the
defendant's attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement the examina-
tion by such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective
jurors such additional questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1989).
13. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3, at 722,
(1984) (citing a study reflecting that over one-half of federal trial judges surveyed conduct voir
dire examination personally, while an additional one-third permit counsel to supplement the




stantial disadvantage to defense counsel who may be forced to rely on
the initial dialogue with jurors to create a positive impression on them,
particularly when the credibility of the defense advanced, rather than
weakness in the prosecution's case, forms the core of the defense trial
theory and strategy. Nevertheless, the actual conduct of the examina-
tion remains vested in the trial court's discretion, even though defense
counsel may have some qualified right to insist that certain questions
be included in the examination.1"
B. Jury Selection and Constitutional Considerations
The Supreme Court's decisions in the area of jury selection have
focused on constitutional guarantees, as well as the Court's supervisory
role in the conduct of federal litigation.' Three specific subjects have
brought the Court into review of state jury selection practice: 1) exclu-
sion of jurors unable to impose the death penalty in state capital prose-
cutions; 2) the problem of exclusion of classes of jurors through statu-
tory means or exercise of peremptory challenges to produce petit juries
substantially different in racial or ethnic composition than the commu-
nity as a whole; and 3) the scope of voir dire afforded counsel in ensur-
ing that the accused enjoys a trial before a fair and impartial jury. In
each instance, the Court has looked to federal constitutional guarantees
afforded to individual criminal defendants as a basis for reviewing state
practice and procedure.1 The Sixth Amendment specifically guaran-
tees an accused in a federal criminal prosecution the right to trial
before an impartial jury drawn from the state and district in which the
prosecution is commenced, 7 and this provision has long been held ap-
14. Presumably, as well, a federal prosecutor might argue successfully that a federal district
judge could not properly voir dire a jury in a capital case in which the death penalty was sought
without engaging in a proper examination relating to potential conscientious objection on the part
of jurors to imposition of the death penalty, based on application of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968).
15. In matters of state practice, the Court has interpreted its role as "limited to enforcing
the commands of the United States Constitution." Mu'Min v. Virginia, Ill S.Ct. 1899, 1903
(1991).
16. The Court has relied on the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment in finding that an accused, exercising his right to jury trial in a criminal
prosecution, has a right to expect that the jury ultimately selected be fair and impartial in ap-
proaching its duties. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261
(1947).
17. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. Federal jurors are selected pursuant to the Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1877, which excludes from service on grand and petit
juries, among others, persons unable to read, write, understand or speak English; and those people
[Vol. 15:37
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plicable to state prosecutions in the grand18 and petit juries. 19 In addi-
tion, the Eighth Amendment protection against infliction of cruel and
unusual punishments2" has afforded an additional basis for review of
state jury selection procedures in capital cases, a significant portion of
the Court's caseload in recent years.
1. Death Qualification of Jurors in State Capital Trials
The leading case on death qualification, or the process of qualify-
ing prospective jurors in capital murder prosecutions in which the sen-
tence of death is sought by the state, is Witherspoon v. Illinois.2 In
Witherspoon, the Court effectively adopted a bright line rule limiting
the state trial court's right to exclude from jury service those jurors
who expressed general objections or concerns regarding imposition of
the death penalty or capital punishment, holding that exclusion is
proper only when the prospective juror would fail to follow the law or
properly apply the law to the evidence in order to ensure that the death
incapable, "by reason of mental or physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service." Id.
§ 1865(b)(2-4).
18. E.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492-93 & n.12 (1977) (tracing history of
Court's holding that exclusion of ethnic minorities from grand jury service violates right to due
process in criminal prosecution to Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883) and applying holding to
African and Hispanic Americans).
19. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), the Court invalidated a West Vir-
ginia statute which restricted jury eligibility to whites, excluding service by otherwise qualified
African-Americans. Similarly, in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Court held that a
system of exclusion of female juries utilized in Louisiana effectively deprived criminal defendants
of a fair cross-section of the community in the jury pool from which jury panels were drawn,
applying the Sixth Amendment guarantee as a constitutional basis for invalidation of this
procedure.
20. U.S. CONSr. amend. VIII.
21. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). Arkansas follows the Witherspoon formulation in directing trial
courts to exclude those prospective jurors from service in capital cases whose views on the death
penalty would preclude them from fairly performing the fact-finding function on either the ques-
tion of guilt or innocence or the determination of sentence. See, e.g., Van Cleave v. State, 268
Ark. 514, 520, 598 S.W.2d 65, 68-69 (1980). Witherspoon, however, does not command express
state compliance with the minimal constitutional standard imposed; a state could afford the ac-
cused greater protection as a matter of state law or procedure by declining to authorize exclusion
of a juror based on his or her beliefs or opposition to the imposition of the death penalty, following
the principle of application of alternative state constitutional, statutory, or procedural grounds
recognized by the Court in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-42 (1983). States are gener-
ally free to provide a greater level of protection to criminal defendants than that mandated by the
federal constitution, and the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence reflects minimal stan-
dards for imposition of capital punishment, not maximum safeguards. California v. Ramos, 463
U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983).
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penalty would not be imposed.22
The Court affirmed its commitment to the principles enunciated in
Witherspoon in Adams v. Texas.2" There, the Court declined to uphold
a Texas procedure construed as more restrictive than Witherspoon. Ad-
ams concerned the effect of certain juror responses to special issues and
interrogatories propounded by the trial court during the punishment
phase. The Texas procedure at issue in the case authorized the exclu-
sion of jurors who would be "affected" in their deliberations by the
possibility that their responses would result in imposition of the death
penalty.
24
Post-Witherspoon litigation in the Court has focused on implemen-
tation of the guarantee to a fair and impartial jury applied to capital
cases. In subsequent decisions, the Court has notably held, without
deviation, that improper exclusion of even a single Witherspoon-quali-
fled juror requires that the death sentence eventually imposed be va-
cated without further showing of prejudice on the part of jurors ulti-
mately serving in the capital trial.2 5
More recently, in Gray v. Mississippi 26 and Ross v. Oklahoma,
2 7
the Court considered the problem of preservation of error in the context
of unused peremptories. In Gray the prosecution contended that since
the state had unused peremptories that would have been used to re-
move a juror otherwise improperly excused by the trial judge in viola-
tion of Witherspoon, the error in the exclusion should be deemed harm-
22. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 & n.12. The Court predicated its holding in Witherspoon
on the accused's Sixth Amendment right to a jury fairly representative of divergent attitudes on
the critical issue of capital punishment in the community. Thus, the ruling rests on a Sixth
Amendment jury composition guarantee rather than upon a claim that imposition of the penalty
would violate the Eighth Amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishments.
23. 448 U.S. 38 (1980). The Texas statute at issue expressly provided for the exclusion of
any juror who could not affirmatively swear on his or her oath that the fact that the punishment of
death might be imposed as a result of responses given to the special issues posed during the pun-
ishment phase deliberations would not "affect" their deliberations. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
12.31 (West 1974). The Court concluded that this oath would serve to unduly restrict jury service
in excluding jurors who candidly admitted that the severity of the potential penalty would cause
them to take their duties more seriously.
24. 448 U.S. at 45.
25. E.g., Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 (1976); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970);
Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969) (holding that the test applied for review of Witherspoon
error is whether or not a single member of the venire has been improperly excluded; if so, subse-
quent imposition of death penalty cannot stand).
26. 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
27. 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
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JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
less. 8 However, in Ross the Court declined to hold that the trial
court's error in failing to excuse a juror properly challenged for cause
required reversal where the defense counsel struck the juror perempto-
rily, but neither exhausted its allotment of peremptories nor demon-
strated that it had been forced to accept an objectionable juror due to
the trial court's refusal to exclude the tainted juror.29
In addition, another line of Supreme Court decisions has dealt
with the deference to be accorded state trial judges in the implementa-
tion of Witherspoon in light of actual responses given by prospective
jurors during voir dire. In Wainwright v. Witt,30 the Court concluded
that the trial court is afforded the most reliable perspective for deter-
mining whether or not views expressed by a juror generally troubled by
potential imposition of the death penalty will compromise the juror's
ability to sit fairly in judgment.31 This posture was reaffirmed a year
later in Darden v. Wainwright32 where the trial court excluded a pro-
spective juror whose religious values indicated an inability to serve as a
fair and impartial juror despite failure to couch an excluding question
in the correct language under Witherspoon.33
In perhaps the most interesting challenge to state death penalty
prosecutions suggested by the holding in Witherspoon, the Court held
in Lockhart v. McCreea4 that death qualification of a jury for service
28. 481 U.S. at 664-66 & nn.14-16.
29. 487 U.S. at 88-89. The Court relied on Oklahoma law for the proposition that the
defense must demonstrate that it was deprived of a fair trial by an impartial jury because the use
of a peremptory to remove a juror who should have been excused by the trial court upon challenge
ultimately forced the defendant to accept another objectionable juror who could not be excluded
because all peremptory challenges had been exhausted. Id. at 89. Arkansas applies a similar rule
for preservation of error in instances of trial court abuse of discretion for failing to excuse an
objectionable juror. E.g., Conley v. State, 270 Ark. 886, 888-89, 607 S.W.2d 328, 329-30 (1980).
30. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
31. Id. at 430. Determinations by state judges as to potential juror performance in such
circumstances were deemed to constitute "findings of fact" entitled to deference by federal habeas
courts in applications for habeas relief brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Id. at 426-31.
See also O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1983) (Higgonbotham, J., concurring
specially) (setting forth factors which favor deference to trial court determinations on juror quali-
fication for service in capital cases when Witherspoon issues raised).
32. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
33. Id. at 175-78. Moreover, defense counsel did not expressly object to the exclusion of the
prospective juror following the trial court's questioning of the juror, which disclosed that he had
religious convictions that would impair his ability to consider the option of imposition of the death
penalty as a punishment in the case. Id. at 178.
34. 476 U.S. 162 (1986), Originally, the respondent in the case had been another defend-
ant, Grigsby, who was murdered in his cell prior to the case being argued before the Supreme
Court. McCree was substituted as a party, having prevailed on a similar claim in the consolidated
1992]
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during the punishment phase of a capital trial did not result in the
impanelment of a jury not representing a fair cross-section of the com-
munity for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused. Significantly, the Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment
guarantee to a "fair cross-section" of the community as the standard
for jury composition does not apply to petit juries, as opposed to jury
panels or the venire. 35 Perhaps more significantly, the Court noted that
the "cross-section requirement" related to inclusion or exclusion of dis-
tinctive groups of persons within the community rather than sentiment
as to any particular political, religious, or social belief shared by
persons. 36
Finally, in Morgan v. Illinois,3 the petitioner argued successfully
that he was improperly denied the right to make a specific inquiry of a
prospective juror as to whether he would "automatically" impose the
death penalty upon conviction for capital murder.38 Morgan relied on
the Court's prior decision in Ross v. Oklahoma,3 9 in which the Court
addressed the issue of whether a party must exhaust all peremptories in
order to preserve error. The complained-of error in Ross consisted of
the trial court's refusal to exclude an unqualified juror. The juror in-
volved in Ross was arguably unqualified under Witherspoon because he
affirmed that he would vote to impose the death penalty automatically
upon conviction.4" The Ross Court observed that had the juror "sat on
case below. Robert M. Berry, Remedies to the Dilemma of Death-Qualified Juries, 8 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 479, 479 n.l (1985-86). See also Robert S. Irving & David Schoen, Survey,
Criminal Procedure, 9 U. ARK. LiTTLE ROCK L.J. 129, 134-36 (1986-87) (commenting on Lock-
hart v. McCree).
35. 467 U.S. at 173-74. In so holding, the Court essentially recognized that random selec-
tion of jurors, followed by the selection process and including exercise of peremptories by the
parties, would almost necessarily result in a jury ultimately seated that does not reflect a cross-
section of the population of the community.
36. Id. at 174-77.
37. 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992).
38. 112 S. Ct. at 2226, 2228-30. Justice White, writing for the majority, observed that four
distinct issues were presented for resolution of the petitioner's due process claim:
whether a jury provided to a capital defendant at the sentencing phase must be impar-
tial; whether such defendant is entitled to challenge for cause and have removed on the
ground of bias a prospective juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty
irrespective of the facts or the trial court's instructions of law; whether on voir dire the
court must, on defendant's request, inquire into the prospective jurors' views on capital
punishment; and whether the voir dire in this case was constitutionally sufficient.
Id. at 2228. The majority answered the first three inquiries in the affirmative before addressing
the adequacy of voir dire in petitioner Morgan's case. Id. at 2229-30.
39. Supra notes 26-28, and accompanying text.
40. 108 S. Ct. at 2276.
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the jury that ultimately sentenced petitioner to death, and had peti-
tioner properly preserved his right to challenge the trial court's failure
to remove [the juror] for cause, the sentence would have to be over-
turned."'" The majority in Morgan observed that Ross had implicitly
recognized a right of capital defendants to inquire as to the predisposi-
tion of prospective jurors in imposition of the death penalty as a pun-
ishment and that a denial of specific examination on this point consti-
tuted reversible error, foreshadowing its reversal of the Illinois
Supreme Court in Morgan's case.42
This term, the Court's docket includes another interesting post-
Witherspoon/A dams challenge to death qualification of capital juries.
In State v. Sullivan, 596 So. 2d177 (La.1990), cert granted, 61
U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S.)(Oct. 19, 1992)(No. 92-5129), the petitioner ar-
gues that exclusion of jurors expressing reservations about capital pun-
ishment, but who affirm their ability to sit impartially in the guilt/
innocence phase of a bifurcated trial violates his Sixth Amendment
rights. See Sullivan, 596 So.2d at 187 (La. 1992). The grant of certio-
rari does not necessarily mean that the Court will change its approach
to death qualification and impose new rules favoring capital defend-
ants. Nevertheless, review of this contention could lead to modification
of the Court's previous holding that so-called "death qualified" juries
are not inherently prone to conviction. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 177-84 (1986); State v. Ward, 483 So.2d 578 (La1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986).
2. Exclusion of Minority Jurors Through use of Peremptories
The most active area of Supreme Court decision-making in the
41. Id. at 2277.
42. 112 S. Ct. at 2232 n.8. See also, Jackson v. Illinois, 113 S.Ct' 32 (1992) (remanded to
the Supreme Court of Illinois for further consideration in light of Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct.
1222 (1992).
This term, the Court's docket includes another interesting post- Witherspoon/Adams chal-
lenge to death qualification of capital juries. In State v. Sullivan, 596 So.2d 177 (La. 1990), cert.
granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3301 U.S. (Oct. 19, 1992) (No. 92-5129), the petitioner argues that exclu-
sion of jurors expressing reservations about capital punishment, but who affirm their ability to sit
impartially in the guilt/innocence phase of a bifurcated trial violates his Sixth Amendment rights.
See Sullivan, 596 So.2d at 187 (La. 1992). The grant of certiorari does not necessarily mean that
the Court will change its approach to death qualification and impose new rules favoring capital
defendants. Nevertheless, review of this contention could lead to modification of the Court's previ-
ous holding that so-called "death qualified" juries are not inherently prone to conviction. See
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 177-84 (1986); State v. Ward, 483 So.2d 578 (La. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1986).
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area of jury composition in recent years has been in the eventual recog-
nition of the potential for abuse in jury selection inherent in the unfet-
tered exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude all members of dis-
tinctive groups from jury service. In Swain v. Alabama,"s the Court
expressly concluded that exclusion of minority jurors through the exer-
cise of peremptory challenges resulted in a violation of equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment, while also concluding that in order
to establish such a violation, the defendant must show that such exclu-
sion by the state followed a pattern of discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges."' While recognizing that access to peremptory challenges is
not a matter of constitutional dimension,"' the Court, nevertheless, rec-
ognized that certain uses of peremptories, such as in a patently discrim-
inatory fashion, would raise constitutional issues.'8
The requirement that the defense demonstrate a pattern of dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges proved functionally unwork-
able, however, as the Court ultimately recognized in Batson v. Ken-
tucky.' The Batson Court concluded that an accused could
demonstrate a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges by the State through the prosecutor's exclusion of members
of the defendant's "cognizable racial group," in addition to any facts or
circumstances indicating purposeful discrimination on the part of the
State. 8 Once the defendant makes the prima facie showing, the burden
43. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
44. Id. at 223-26. The Court reasoned, "(W]e cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in a
particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws." Id. at 221. Instead, the defendant must
demonstrate systematic exclusion of minority jurors. Id. at 227-28.
45. Id. at 219; See also Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2273, 2278 (1988).
46. 380 U.S. at 219. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) the Court struck a
state statute qualifying only white persons for jury service. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203. The Swain
Court adhered to the principle underlying this earlier decision when Justice White, writing for the
majority, observed: "Although a Negro defendant is not entitled to a jury containing members of
his race, a State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as
jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 203-04. This
approach recognizes the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, as one functionally
implicating the civil rights of prospective jurors struck on the basis of race rather than defendants
asserting a right to fair and impartial jurors as a component either of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee or due process.
47. 476 U.S. 79, 92-95 & n.17 (1986) (holding that the defendant could establish a prima
facie case of equal protection violation based on the prosecutor's exercise of peremptories to ex-
clude members of the defendant's race from the jury in defendant's case without reference to
pattern of discriminatory use of peremptories). See generally Thomas N. Carpenter, A Justifiable
Peremptory: The Oxymoron of Jury Selection, ARK. LAw., Fall 1992, at 24-27.
48. Id. at 96-97. For a discussion of the implementation of Batson see Alan Raphael, Dis-
criminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky, 25 WILLAMETrE
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then shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate a "neutral" explanation
for the exercise of peremptory strikes against minority jurors. 9
Batson does not address the proper action to be taken by the trial
court upon its finding that the prosecution has not effectively rebutted
the charge once the burden has shifted,50 but presumably, the declara-
tion of a mistrial would be a proper remedy. Such a mistrial declara-
tion, however, would appear to raise serious questions about the "mani-
fest necessity" required for retrial without violation of the double
jeopardy protections afforded by the federal constitution 1 since the
prosecution could always avoid an unfavorably constituted jury drawn
from a randomly selected panel simply by violating Batson and forcing
the defense counsel to move for mistrial. 2 The Arkansas Supreme
Court, in Pacee v. State,5" resolved this problem in favor of holding
struck panelists until such time as the jury had been sworn. If the Bat-
son challenge proves successful, the improperly excluded venirepersons
can then be seated, eliminating the need for mistrial.
The Batson decision left other questions open that are being an-
swered in post-Batson litigation. Perhaps most interestingly, the
Court's posture in the case necessarily raises the issue of other circum-
stances in which prohibition against racially discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges might apply. Since Batson was decided on equal
protection grounds 4 instead of the fair trial or fair cross-section guar-
antees of the Sixth Amendment, and the discrimination was directed at
a member of the venire rather than the accused, the opinion suggests
that discriminatory use of peremptories in any context is constitution-
ally forbidden.
In fact, the prohibited state action actually lies in the trial court's
exclusion of minority jurors as a result of counsel's determination of
L. REv. 293 (1989), cited with approval in Pacee v. State, 306 Ark. 563, 567, 816 S.W.2d 856,
859 (1991).
49. 476 U.S. at 97-98 (observing that denial of discriminatory motivation alone is insuffi-
cient to rebut the prima facie case made by the accused).
50. In fact, the Court expressly declined to address the issue of appropriate remedies to be
employed by state courts confronted by Batson-based objections to the prosecution's use of pe-
remptory challenges in discriminatory fashion. 476 U.S. at 99 & n.24.
51. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
52. See supra note 46. In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982), for instance, the Court
held that prosecutor misconduct requiring defense counsel to move for mistrial-presumably waiv-
ing double jeopardy bar-could itself bar retrial if the prosecutor intended to goad the defendant
into moving for a mistrial. Id. at 679.
53. Pacee v. State, 306 Ark. 563, 567, 816 S.W.2d. 856, 859 (1991).
54. 476 U.S. at 93 (involving a claim that arises under the Equal Protection Clause).
1992]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
prospective jurors to be peremptorily removed from the panel. Thus, in
two 1991 decisions, Powers v. Ohio5 and Edmonson v. Leesville Con-
crete Co.,56 the Court extended the underlying principles of the Batson
holding. In the former case, the Court concluded that a Batson chal-
lenge should be sustained regardless of the race of the accused and that
the rule of Batson relates to the discriminatory removal of minority
jurors." In Edmonson, it held that civil litigants were precluded from
racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. 8
Because the subjects of the discriminatory intent are excluded mi-
nority jurors, those jurors so excluded would logically have standing
themselves to challenge the actions of the trial court 9 since they have
actually suffered the complained-of injury. The important question left
unresolved-whether or not the State may challenge an apparent viola-
tion of Batson by defense counsel in a criminal matter-was addressed
recently by the Court in Georgia v. McCollum." Since the Batson ra-
tionale permitted the unusual situation of vicarious assertion of feder-
ally protected rights, that is, the accused claiming injury to the ex-
cluded juror, the Court's resolution of this issue was certain to prove
most interesting. Essentially, the Court was faced with the prospect of
breaking with its post-Batson pattern of condemning discriminatory use
of strikes or maintaining consistency in holding that a criminal defend-
ant's use of peremptory challenges may, in fact, constitute state action.
Eventually, the majority elected consistency over Justice O'Connor's
spirited dissent in which she objected to the characterization of an ac-
cused's use of peremptories as state action. 61 Justice Thomas' thought-
ful concurrence predicted an ultimate end to the use of peremptories, a
55. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
56. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
57. 111 S. Ct. at 1366 (affirming that "racial discrimination in the qualification or selection
of jurors offends the dignity of persons and integrity of the court.").
58. 111 S. Ct. at 2087. A private litigant becomes a "state actor" when exercising a pe-
remptory challenge, and consequently, a discriminatory intent in the decision to strike violates the
Constitution. Id. at 2086-87.
59. Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); see also Holland v.
Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 812 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the private litigant
exercising peremptories in a discriminatory fashion might also be the subject of an action predi-
cated on a conspiracy-to-violate-civil-rights theory brought by the excluded juror(s) as plaintiffs).
60. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). See also Georgia v. Carr, 113 S.Ct. 30 (1992) (remanded to
the Supreme Court of Georgia for further consideration in light of Georgia v. McCollumn, 112
S.Ct. 2348(1992)).
61. Id. at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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prospect he noted as particularly unsatisfactory for black defendants. 62
The difficulty posed by Georgia v. McCollum lies in the fact that
the Court has persistently concluded that discriminatory exercise of pe-
remptory challenges raises equal protection63 rather than Sixth Amend-
ment problems. Had the theory of prejudice been predicated on viola-
tion of fair cross-section requirements, then clearly the protection
afforded by Batson would not have extended to vicarious assertion of
the rights of excluded jurors by civil litigants or by the prosecution in
attacking defense strategy in jury selection. Because the Sixth Amend-
ment protection is limited to criminal prosecutions and extends only to
the accused, the scope of asserting the rights of excluded minority ju-
rors would not come into play. Rather, excluded jurors would retain
their equal protection rights in asserting claims directly, as in Carter v.
Jury Commission of Greene County,6" and claims based upon the dis-
criminatory use of peremptories affecting the fairness of trial would be
reserved to the defense in criminal prosecutions.
However, in Holland v. Illinois,6 the Court rejected a Sixth
Amendment-based claim attacking discriminatory use of peremptories
by the prosecution. Instead, it held that Sixth Amendment challenges
are limited to state statutory schemes or procedures which limit service
on the panel or venire, rather than on factors influencing the composi-
tion of individual petit juries, such that cognizable groups within the
community are excluded from service. Thus, a state statute qualifying
only white persons as jurors" or which unduly excludes females from
jury service67 frustrates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right dis-
cerned in Holland "to object to a venire that is not designed to re-
62. Id. at 2359-60 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas argued that the Court's Bat-
son jurisprudence resulted in distorted priorities, elevating the rights of prospective jurors to sit on
trial juries over the interest of criminal defendants in seeking to avoid prejudice-influenced ver-
dicts. He noted that without admission of racial prejudice by prospective jurors during voir dire,
there was a likelihood that a defendant could never fully develop a record sufficient to justify
exclusion. Consequently, the accused would run the risk of prejudice contributing to conviction.
Id. at 2360. Justice Thomas also observed: "Next will come the question whether defendants may
exercise peremptories on the basis of sex. See, e.g., United States v. DeGross, 960 F.2d 1463 (9th
Cir. 1992)." Id. at 2361.
63. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04. See also supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
64. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
65. 110 S. Ct. 803, 811 (1990) (holding that the petitioner "does not have a valid constitu-
tional challenge based on the Sixth Amendment-which no more forbids the prosecutor to strike
jurors on the basis of race than it forbids him to strike them on the basis of innumerable other
generalized characteristics.")
66. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
67. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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present a fair cross-section of the community, whether or not the sys-
tematically excluded groups are groups to which he himself belongs." 8
Once the issue focuses on the composition of the jury actually se-
lected-pared by random selection, excusals of jurors for statutory dis-
qualification, or by submission for cause by counsel, and by exercise of
peremptories by the parties-the accused no longer enjoys a right to a
fair cross-section of the community either in terms of race, gender rep-
resentation, or community attitudes.8 9 Instead, Justice Scalia's majority
opinion in Holland recognizes that the source of constitutional violation
in nonrepresentation of minorities on the jury ultimately selected flows
from the discriminatory exercise of peremptories in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment7" if the prosecution has used its peremptories
to exclude jurors based on their race.71
One additional problem posed by Batson involved its application to
cases finalized before the effective date of the decision. 2 In Allen v.
Hardy75 the Court rejected petitioner's reliance on Batson in a collat-
eral attack upon his state court conviction, having lost his direct appeal
in which he relied on the Court's prior holding in Swain v. Alabama.
7
4
The Court declined to apply Batson retroactively to cases already final-
ized in terms of direct appeal because it essentially announced a new
rule of procedure, despite the fact that the substantive claim of dis-
criminatory use of peremptories was properly advanced by the defend-
68. 110 S. Ct. at 805.
69. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (stating the defendant is not entitled to a
petit jury which includes jurors whose attitudes toward the death penalty are otherwise such as to
disqualify them from service as fair and impartial jurors).
70. 110 S. Ct. at 806. Interestingly, Justice Scalia filed a strong dissent in McCollum, sup-
porting the reasoning of Justice O'Connor in her dissent and pointedly observing the perverse logic
necessitated by the prior decision in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: "Barely a year later, we
witness its reduction to the terminally absurd: A criminal defendant, in the process of defending
himself against the state, is held to be acting on behalf of the state." 112 S. Ct. at 2364.
71. 110 S. Ct. at 811 & n.3. (observing that the equal protection claim was not before the
Court because defendant expressly relied on Sixth Amendment fair-trial theory and impliedly
holding that equal protection claim might, nevertheless, have merit on facts of case).
72. Cases in which Batson-type claims had been raised prior to the decision and which had
not been decided at the time of the decision were apparently accorded a window of opportunity by
the Court in Ford v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 850 (1991) where it recognized that a litigant asserting a
claim of discriminatory use of peremptories could rely on the new holding and the lowered thresh-
hold of proof set forth in Batson.
73. 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
74. Id. at 257-58. The Court noted that the standard employed in Swain required proof of a
systematic exclusion of minority jurors through exercise of peremptories, while Batson had altered
the procedure involved to facilitate claims based only on a showing that minority jurors had been
removed through exercise of peremptories in the accused's case alone. Id. at 258-60.
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ant in his direct appeal. 5 Consequently, the petitioner lost because he
could not rely on the beneficial changes in procedural law adopted by
the Court in Batson and could not meet the more rigorous standard of
proof under Batson's predecessor, Swain.
76
If there is a way around the non-retroactivity of Batson for future
litigants who were convicted by unconstitutionally-constituted petit ju-
ries, that way appears to have been successfully pursued by at least one
federal habeas petitioner. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed habeas relief
granted in Hollis v. Davis"7 and reversed the trial court's denial of re-
lief in Horton v. Zant78 based on application of the Swain standard in
pre-Batson cases not entitled to reliance on the new rule announced
there. In Hollis, moreover, the court recognized a claim of ineffective
assistance resulting from the trial counsel's failure to challenge the im-
proper exclusion of minority jurors as "cause" for the defendant's pro-
cedural default on this issue in his direct appeal in state proceedings.7 9
In Horton, a capital case in which the death penalty had been
imposed, the Court did not rely on ineffective assistance to excuse state
procedural default, but held that on application of the Swain standard,
the petitioner had demonstrated a racially discriminatory pattern in the
exercise of peremptories by the prosecution."0
Hollis and Horton demonstrate that the non-retroactivity of Bat-
son, while proving a problem in terms of proof, does not foreclose suc-
cessful claims relating to the discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges, even in cases pre-dating both Swain and Batson, particularly
since the complaint in Hollis focused on his 1959 burglary conviction.
Here, the Court's long-held position on racial discrimination in jury
selection serves to demonstrate counsel's failure to properly protect the
75. Id. at 258-60. The "new rule" language of Allen is consistent with the general approach
to retroactivity later announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
76. One might note the text of the majority's concluding footnote in Batson: "To the extent
that anything in Swain v. Alabama is contrary to the principles we articulate toda'y, that decision
is overruled." 476 U.S. at 100 n.25 (citation omitted).
77. 941 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1478 (1992).
78. 941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1991).
79. 941 F.2d at 1476-77. The court relied on Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)
in holding that an ineffective assistance claim may afford an alternative route to federal review of
constitutional claims defaulted in the state trial and appellate process, especially where the State
conceded that further efforts to litigate those claims in state court would be futile. 941 F.2d at
1476 n.4.
80. 941 F.2d at 1453-60. In an appendix to the Horton opinion, the Court set forth the
evidence of a discriminatory pattern in the use of peremptories by the trial prosecutor which
supported Horton's Swain claim. Id. at 1468-70 app.
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client's right to a non-discriminatorily drawn venire and jury. Assum-
ing that counsel should have been aware of this history, dating at least
from the 1879 decision in Strauder, failure to timely object to the dis-
criminatory use of peremptories may serve as a basis for a claim of
deficient representation cognizable under Strickland v. Washington.81
The possibility for successful litigation in pre-Batson discrimina-
tion claims based on ineffective assistance claims no doubt will be ap-
plauded by many inmates and prove a source of despair for their coun-
sel, now considered-retroactively-ineffective for failing to press
claims of discrimination in use of peremptory challenges by state
prosecutors.
3. Scope of Voir Dire Examination
Although the scope of voir dire is generally committed to the dis-
cretion of the trial court and raises few constitutional questions, at least
one fairly recent decision of the Court demonstrates that some limita-
tion on voir dire may constitute a constitutional violation. In Turner v.
Murray,2 the Court held that in an interracial capital case, the trial
court's refusal to permit inquiry concerning racial prejudice of prospec-
tive jurors and the potential impact of juror prejudice on fact-finding
violated the accused's constitutional right to an impartial jury.83 The
Court distinguished the case from its prior holding in Ristaino v.
Ross, 4 in which the Court had rejected a constitutionally-mandated
right to such questioning of prospective jurors in a non-capital case.85
That decision had distinguished prior holdings of the Court, suggesting
that inquiry into racially prejudicial attitudes of prospective jurors
81. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In fact, trial counsel in Hollis apparently contended that he did
not believe that in 1959 it was illegal to exclude African-Americans from jury service in Alabama.
It is clear, however, that the Supreme Court thought that it was, based upon Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) and Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). Counsel's mispercep-
tion indicated a deficiency in his understanding of constitutional law affecting the competence of
his representation. This is particularly so since the Court had also, in Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587 (1935), expressly considered the question of exclusion of minority jurors in counsel's own
jurisdiction and held that systematic exclusion was unconstitutional. See Hollis, 941 F.2d at 1477
& nn.5-7.
82. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
83. Id. at 36 & n.9. The Court expressly refers to both the Sixth Amendment guarantee to
impartial jury and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process.
84. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
85. In Ristaino, the Court had concluded that the facts that the-accused is black and the
victim white would not demonstrate a "constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent question-
ing about racial prejudice" a fair and impartial jury would not be selected. 424 U.S. at 596.
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would be essential to the seating of a fair jury in some instances."
Assuming that the Court's decision in Turner v. Murray reflects
heightened concern for the accused's right to examine prospective ju-
rors because of the potential for infliction of the death penalty, 87 the
later holding in Morgan v. Illinois8 8 likely can be understood as reflect-
ing that same enhanced concern, unless Turner simply represents a
particular sensitivity to matters of racial discrimination on the part of
the Court.89
Clearly, the Court's subsequent decision in Mu'Min v. Virginia90
suggests that Turner v. Murray is limited to the inquiry of potential
racially discriminatory attitudes on the part of prospective jurors in
capital cases. Mu'Min arose in the context of a capital prosecution in
which the death penalty was imposed following substantial pre-trial
publicity concerning the crime. While the majority adhered to the
traditional view of voir dire as "serv[ing] the dual purposes of enabling
the court to select an impartial jury and assisting counsel in exercising
peremptory challenges," 91 it, nevertheless, held that trial counsel was
not impaired by the trial court's limitation on voir dire concerning pre-
judgment or bias resulting from pre-trial publicity. The trial court had
conducted an examination into potential prejudgment by asking the
panel, and then subpanels of four venirepersons, whether or not they
were influenced by the publicity, accepting silence on the part of pro-
86. E.g., Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (involving issues relating to possible
retaliatory basis for prosecution of black civil rights worker charged with possession of marijuana,
as well as civil rights activities, which might have resulted in unfair jury selection process in
absence of specific questioning); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931). But see Rosales-
Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190 (1981) (finding no constitutional "presumption" of
juror bias based on disparate races of jurors, defendants, and victims).
87. See Turner, 476 U.S. at 36-37. The Court, relying on its prior decision in Ham, limited
application of this rule to capital cases and other prosecutions in which special circumstances of
the case suggest the potential infection of the jury trial process as a result of racially discrimina-
tory attitudes held by jurors.
88. Supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
89. This suggestion is hardly supported by significant recent evidence apart from Batson
and its progeny. For instance, when confronted with the specific claim that the death penalty has
been imposed in a racially disparate fashion, the Court denied relief despite empirical support for
the proposition that black defendants were more likely to suffer the death penalty in cases involv-
ing white victims than in other categories of cases. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
(explaining that in order to prevail on a claim of discriminatory application of penalty, individual
accused must demonstrate that the penalty imposed was with discriminatory intent in his case).
90. 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
91. Id. at 1908. Similarly, in Rosales-Lopez, Justice White had observed that "lack of ade-
quate voir dire impairs the defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges where provided by
statute or rule, as it is in the federal courts." 451 U.S. at 188.
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spective jurors as an affirmation of impartiality. The Court did con-
clude that evidence of extensive public outcry or passion might require
more extensive examination than that conducted at Mu'Min's state
trial. 92
One conclusion to be drawn from Mu'Min is that apart from in-
quiry about racial attitudes of jurors in capital cases involving potential
race-based decision-making in the punishment phase,9 3 few areas of po-
tential inquiry suggest constitutional issues absent a showing of some
actual prejudice resulting from curtailment of voir dire or the likeli-
hood of a constitutionally impermissible potential for prejudice-such
as a wholly inadequate inquiry in potential prejudice resulting from
pre-trial publicity in a notorious case.
II. ARKANSAS LAW RELATING TO VOIR DIRE'AND JURY SELECTION
Analysis of Arkansas law governing the jury selection process may
be undertaken by evaluating four different areas of court decisions and
applicable statutory and rules provisions. These include: a) delegation
of supervision of the jury selection process to the trial court; b) compli-
ance with constitutionally-based decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court; c) exercise of discretion by the trial court in exclusion of
prospective jurors upon submission for cause; and d) compliance with
procedural requirements for preservation of error in the jury selection
process.
A. Trial Court Responsibility for Jury Selection
Provisions of the Arkansas Code define qualifications of jurors;94
determine exemption of certain persons from service;95 provide for the
92. 111 S. Ct. at 1907. The test applied by the Mu'Min Court to determine if voir dire is
constitutionally inadequate is whether manifest error in the conduct of voir dire is demonstrated
by a showing that jurors had "fixed opinions" on the issue of guilt such that they could not sit as
fair and impartial jurors. Id. at 1899. Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, found the trial court's
acceptance of silence as an affirmative response on the issue of impartiality to be inadequate and
urged individual inquiry of jurors exposed to such potentially damaging pretrial publicity. Id. at
1919 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
93. The Turner majority concluded that the error in depriving the accused of full inquiry
into racially discriminatory attitudes of prospective jurors would not infect the integrity of the
decision to convict ultimately reached by the jury, as seated, because the jury in the guilt phase
"had no greater discretion than it would have had if the crime charged had been noncapital mur-
der." 476 U.S. at 37-38.
94. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-31-101 to-102 (Michie 1987).
95. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-103 (Michie Supp. 1991).
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means of selection and summoning of petit jurors for service in crimi-
nal trials;96 provide for the examination of jurors;97 and provide for the
challenge of jurors in criminal trials.98
In addition, two provisions of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
Procedure specifically govern the process of jury selection in criminal
trials. Rule 32.1 provides for the use of jury questionnaires to elicit
basic information concerning prospective jurors.9 Rule 32.2 provides a
framework for the commencement of voir dire and directs certain in-
quiries to be made by the trial court.100
Within the framework provided by the applicable statutory and
rules provisions, Arkansas law commits the supervision of the jury se-
lection process to the trial court. Generally, the determination of the
extent and scope of voir dire examination is committed to the trial
court's sound exercise of discretion. 101 The parameters of the exercise
of discretion in limiting voir dire may to some extent be discerned from
the decisions of the Arkansas appellate courts.
In Van Cleave v. State'°2 the state supreme court discussed certain
principles for the conduct of voir dire by counsel. The court advised
that voir dire does not simply serve to permit counsel to "get ac-
quainted" with the jury, 03 and the trial court's restriction on voir dire
by defense counsel was upheld as a proper exercise of discretion. The
decision rests in part on defense counsel's strategy in relying only on a
general plea of not guilty, rather than developing an affirmative defense
or other specific defense which might compel greater latitude in coun-
sel's discussions with jurors. 0 4 In this sense the case was distinguisha-
ble from Fauna v. State,1 5 a reversal of the same trial court achieved
96. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-32-202 to-203 (Michie 1987).
97. ARK.. CODE. ANN. § 16-33-101 (Michie 1987).
98. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-33-302 to-308 (Michie 1987).
99. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 requires juror disclosure prior to the commencement of the
selection process of the following information about each prospective juror: age; marital status;
extent of education; occupation of juror and spouse; and prior jury service.
100. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(a) requires the trial court to "initiate the voir dire examination
by: (i) identifying the parties; and (ii) identifying the respective counsel; and (iii) revealing the
names of those witnesses whose names have been made known to the court by the parties; and (iv)
briefly outlining the nature of the case." The court is then accorded discretion to conduct further
investigation or permit additional examination by the parties or counsel. ARK.. R. CRIM. P.
32.2(b).
101. Bryant v. State, 304 Ark. 514, 803 S.W.2d 546 (1991) (applying Rule 32.2).
102. 268 Ark. 514, 598 S.W.2d 65 (1980).
103. Id. at 518, 598 S.W.2d at 67.
104. Id.
105. 265 Ark. 934, 582 S.W.2d 18 (1979).
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by the same defense counsel who represented Van Cleave the preceding
year in which a defense of insanity had been interposed, and the trial
court's abrupt limitation on questioning to the juror's ability to follow
the law was deemed inadequate to permit counsel to fully explain the
defensive theory.106
The supreme court explained the trial court's discretion in control-
ling voir dire in Johnson v. State1 0 7 as follows: "[t]he extent and scope
of voir dire examination is largely a matter of judicial discretion and
boundaries of that discretion are rather wide. The restriction of voir
dire examination will not be reversed on appeal unless that discretion is
clearly abused."108 The difficulty in defining precisely the parameters of
voir dire in all cases had previously been noted by the court in Jones v.
State: "[T]he range of permissible inquiries and the diversity of legiti-
mate questions are so great as to make it impossible to lay down rigid
rules governing counsel's examination of jurors."109
The breadth and duration of voir dire, therefore, rest within the
peculiar exercise of the trial court's discretion, and limits imposed by
the court will likely reflect prior experience and perception of counsel's
understanding of the process and skill in conducting examination as an
important element of the trial process.
What is clear is that absent an abuse of discretion in limiting trial
counsel's examination of the prospective jurors, the trial court's action
will not result in reversal. For example, in Novak v. State1 10 the court
held that defense counsel's attempt to bind prospective jurors to vote
for acquittal if the State failed to prove all elements of its case was
improper and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the questioning."' Similarly, when counsel then tried to explore the
jury's response to a failure of proof on the predicate felony in the capi-
tal case in which the murder rested on proof of that underlying felony,
the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to the form of the
question. Because counsel did not attempt to rephrase the question and
moved on to other matters, the court held that no error attended the
106. Id. at 936, 582 S.W.2d at 19.
107. 298 Ark. 617, 770 S.W.2d 128 (1989).
108. Id. at 623, 770 S.W.2d at 131.
109. 283 Ark. 308, 312, 675 S.W.2d 825, 827 (1984). The court held that no abuse of
discretion was committed by the trial court in permitting the prosecutor to inquire as to whether
or not a juror might "block out" the testimony of the State's key witness, an accomplice who had
already been convicted of the offense.
110. 287 Ark. 271, 698 S.W.2d 499 (1985).
111. Id. at 274-75, 698 S.W.2d at 502.
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trial court's exercise of discretion in sustaining the objection.11 This
holding suggests the importance of pursuing legitimate lines of exami-
nation-here, the jurors' understanding of the allocation of the burden
of proof as to each element of the capital offense charged-in order to
preserve error in the trial court's limitation of defense counsel's
examination.
Some limitations on the exercise of discretion apart from abuse in
terms of improper limitation on explanation of the theory of case are
clearly imposed by case law. For instance, while the conduct of the
examination rests within the trial court's supervisory role over the trial
process, certain requirements imposed by statute or rule cannot be dis-
regarded by a trial court without incurring reversal. For example, in
Chenowith v. State,113 a leading case on conduct of the jury selection
process, the court addressed two important aspects of the process. First,
while the accused is accorded a right of individual voir dire examina-
tion of prospective jurors, the court noted that the trial court retains
discretion to permit more than one juror to be subjected to examination
at the same time. 1 ' Second, the court affirmed the defendant's statu-
tory right to exercise his peremptory challenge discretion following the
prosecutor's decision not to exercise a strike as to the particular ju-
ror, 1 5 a procedure which precludes the accused from having to exercise
a peremptory against a prospective juror who would otherwise be
struck by the State and avoiding the intellectually interesting phenom-
ena of "double strikes."
Consequently, while the trial court retains considerable control
over both the selection process and the content and duration of voir dire
examination, this control is not without limitations. Undue restriction
of examination or violation of statutorily-prescribed rights accorded to
the accused may prove grounds for reversal of the exercise of discretion
by the trial judge.
112. Id. at 275, 698 S.W.2d at 502.
113. 291 Ark. 372, 724 S.W.2d 488 (1987). See Pamela J. Bryan, Note, Peremptory Chal-
lenges in Felony Prosecutions, 10 U. ARK. LITtLE ROCK L.J. 415 (1988) (commenting on
Chenowith).
114. 291 Ark. at 378, 724 S.W.2d at 491-92. See also Ford v. State, 276 Ark. 98, 104, 633
S.W.2d 3, 7 (1982) (holding right to individual voir dire in capital case may be waived by defend-
ant who acquiesces in different procedure imposed by trial court).
115. 291 Ark. at 375, 378, 724 S.W.2d at 490-92. This procedure is prescribed by statute.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-33-303(c) (Michie 1987).
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B. Application of Federal Constitutional Jury Selection Law
Arkansas has expressly either followed Supreme Court precedent
or applied similar approaches with respect to death qualification of ju-
ries, redress of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the
prosecution, and inclusion of questioning regarding racial attitudes of
jurors in the examination process when applicable.
1. Death Qualification in Capital Cases
Arkansas has clearly adopted Supreme Court holdings requiring
proper death qualification of jurors who will serve in capital trials. In
Van Cleave v. State,"6 however, the court observed, while expressly
recognizing the applicability of the holding in Witherspoon to Arkansas
capital prosecutions, that imposition of a life sentence rather than
death by an improperly constituted capital jury moots any issue related
to a Witherspoon violation since the defendant apparently suffered no
prejudice given the lesser sentence imposed." 7
Moreover, in Coulter v. State,"8 the court affirmed application of
Witherspoon, but applied Wainwright v. Witt" 9 in deferring to the trial
court's determination that a juror's equivocal responses to questioning
and negative attitudes toward the death penalty justified his exclusion
from a capital jury considering a case involving the rape and murder of
a five year old child.'20 In Witt, the Supreme Court had noted the supe-
rior position of the trial court in evaluation of juror attitudes and re-
sponses in making the determination of whether or not the juror could
be expected to serve fairly and follow the law. 2'
2. Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges
Arkansas has traditionally given deference to the constitutional
prohibition on exclusion of minority jurors from service on account of
race. For instance, in Williams v. State 22 the court held that the ac-
cused had successfully demonstrated error in the process of selection of
the venire in a since-discarded system of selection by jury commission-
116. 268 Ark. 514, 520, 598 S.W.2d 65, 69 (1980).
117. Id. (citing Tanner v. State, 259 Ark. 243, 532 S.W.2d 168 (1976)).
118. 304 Ark. 527, 804 S.W.2d 348 (1991).
119. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
120. 304 Ark. at 531-32, 804 S.W.2d at 350-51.
121. 469 U.S. at 424-26.
122. 254 Ark. 799, 496 S.W.2d 395 (1973).
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ers, adopting the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in
Swain v. Alabama.
128
In Mitchell v. State,"4 the court recognized that the constitutional
right to a jury not tainted by discriminatory exclusion of minority ju-
rors was fundamental, and error in the improper exclusion of even a
single minority juror could not be subjected to harmless error
analysis. 2 5
The proper mode for preservation of Batson error was set forth by
the state supreme court in Colbert v. State.12 6 Following the prosecu-
tion's exercise of its peremptory challenges, defense counsel should in-
terpose in timely fashion a Batson objection to exclusion of minority
jurors on account of race.2 7 If the defendant makes a showing that the
circumstances raise an inference of racially discriminatory intent in the
exercise of the peremptory challenge process, the burden shifts to the
State to provide a racially neutral explanation for its exercise of its
strikes. The trial court must then conduct a "sensitive inquiry" into the
adequacy of any explanation offered by the State if it only superficially
justifies the action.'2 8 The trial court's determination must include a
statement of findings on the record to facilitate appellate review.' 29 In
Colbert, the prosecution struck two black jurors without conducting
any examination of them personally, and later, its basis for exercising
peremptory challenges against them was shown to be inadequate. In
such a case of inadequate explanation, the trial court's exercise of dis-
cretion in accepting the prosecutor's response is subject to reversal. 130
In three significant post-Colbert decisions, the Arkansas supreme
court has more fully developed the parameters of the rights available
under Batson. The prosecutor struck five minority jurors in Pacee v.
123. Id. at 801, 496 S.W.2d at 397.
124. 295 Ark. 341, 750 S.W.2d 936 (1988). See Joe Marcum, Note, Mitchell v. State:
Continuing Erosion of the Peremptory Challenge in Equal Protection Litigation, 42 ARK. L. REV.
1093 (1989) and C. Michael White, Survey, Criminal Procedure, Discriminatory Use of Peremp-
tory Challenges, 12 U. ARK. LIrTrLE ROCK L.J. 193, 200 (1989) (both commenting on holding in
Mitchell).
125. 295 Ark. at 351, 750 S.W.2d at 941.
126. 304 Ark. 250, 801 S.W.2d 643 (1990) (modifying "sensitive inquiry" requirement of
Mitchell).
127. 304 Ark. at 254, 801 S.W.2d at 645.
128. Id. at 255, 801 S.W.2d at 646.
129. Id.
130. The Colbert court held that the proper standard for review of the trial court's ruling in
response to the prosecution's explanation for its use of peremptory challenges to remove minority
jurors is whether the trial court's findings are clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
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State,1"' but did not remove all minority jurors from the panel. Thus,
the accused was not tried before an all-white jury, while the State was
left with unused strikes. 13 2 Nevertheless, defense counsel argued on ap-
peal that the five struck jurors were excluded without having been in-
terrogated by the prosecutor during voir dire, demonstrating that the
grounds for exclusion must have been racially discriminatory. The su-
preme court rejected the argument. 3 Significantly, the court also re-
jected the State's argument on appeal that defense counsel had failed
to make a timely objection to the exclusion of the jurors in waiting
until after the jury had been selected. Instead, the court held that a
Batson objection is timely if made prior to the jury being sworn. 34
The supreme court ordered reversal in Watson v. State 8' based on
the trial court's error in compelling defense counsel to argue his claim
of Batson error before the jury rather than permitting the potentially
inflammatory argument over racial discrimination to be made outside
the jurors' presence." 6 Clearly, defense counsel should pursue the Bat-
son objection outside the presence of the jury in order to avoid poten-
tial prejudice to the client flowing not only from the prosecution's exer-
cise of peremptories, but also from the assertion of the Batson claim
itself.
Finally, in Walker v. State, 7 the supreme court considered the
claim of a Batson violation in the context of a capital prosecution in
which the State had excluded some, but not all, minority jurors from
the jury." 8 The court rejected defense counsel's argument that exclu-
sion of minority jurors was improperly predicated on the prosecutor's
perception that these jurors had reservations about imposition of the
death penalty. In the absence of any record showing improper examina-
tion of the jurors during voir dire that would suggest racial animus, the
supreme court concluded that exclusion of these jurors was clearly jus-
tified because the prosecutor was entitled to consider their attitudes to-
ward imposition of the death penalty as bearing on their suitability for
131. 306 Ark. 563, 816 S.W.2d 856 (1991).
132. Id. at 565-66, 816 S.W.2d at 857-58.
133. Id. at 567, 816 S.W.2d at 859.
134. Id.
135. 308 Ark. 444, 825 S.W.2d 569 (1992).
136. Id. at 448-51, 825 S.W.2d at 571-73.
137. 308 Ark. 498, 825 S.W.2d 822 (1992).
138. Id. at 505, 825 S.W.2d at 826. In fact, the record demonstrated that four black jurors
were seated, giving the jury a greater percentage of minority jurors than reflected in the popula-
tion breakdown for the county.
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service on a capital jury. 13
3. Inquiry into Racial Biases of Prospective Jurors
In Smith v. State"" the Arkansas Court of Appeals applied what
appears to be an even broader right to defense investigation of racial
attitudes held by jurors during voir dire than that contemplated by the
Supreme Court in Turner v. Murray. The court held that restriction on
voir dire as to racial bias of prospective jurors requires reversal, re-
jecting simple qualification by the trial court as to whether or not ju-
rors would be unfairly influenced in reaching their verdict as a result of
the fact that the accused was black."" However, the court also ob-
served that its ruling afforded counsel only a reasonable opportunity for
inquiry, not a right to have all questions which might be asked pro-
pounded to the jurors."'
C. Exercise of Discretion in Excusing Jurors for Cause
Perhaps the most important discretion accorded the trial court lies
in its decision to qualify or disqualify individual jurors during the selec-
tion process, usually as a result of responses given to questions pro-
pounded by the court or trial counsel. Here, the proper understanding
of trial court discretion must accompany evaluation of exclusion deci-
sions. Under Arkansas law, a juror disqualified from service by statute
suffers from implied bias, and the trial court's failure to sustain a
timely challenge to the qualification of the juror by the court consti-
tutes reversible error.""
However, in cases of actual bias where the prospective juror is
challenged based upon attitudes toward the applicable law,"' attitudes
139. Id. In fact, one might question whether any more significant cause for exclusion of a
juror through peremptory challenge might be found than that a juror, otherwise qualified for
service, would, nevertheless, have reservations about imposing a death sentence in a capital prose-
cution. Interestingly, the jury ultimately selected did not sentence the defendant to death, perhaps
leading to the speculation that the four minority jurors serving did, in fact, influence a sentencing
decision favorable to the defense.
140. 33 Ark. App. 52, 800 S.W.2d 440 (1990).
141. Id. at 53, 800 S.W.2d at 441 (following Cochran v. State, 256 Ark. 99, 100, 505
S.W.2d 520, 521 (1974)).
142. Id.
143. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 534, 609 S.W.2d 898, 905 (1980).
144. For instance, a juror must be able to fairly consider the range of penalties which might
be imposed upon conviction in order to be qualified to serve. Haynes v. State, 270 Ark. 685, 692-
93, 606 S.W.2d 563, 566 (1980) (holding that the State may not prequalify the jury by commit-
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toward the accused because of his status as a defendant,145 bias against
the accused personally, 1"6 or prejudgment due to extra-trial information
about the case,147 a reversal of the trial court's decision in qualifying
the jury requires a showing of abuse of discretion.14 8
"Actual bias" is defined as that predisposition which would mean
that the juror cannot try the case impartially or without prejudice to
the rights of the parties.14 9 Despite obvious suggestions of bias on the
part of prospective jurors in many instances, these will not necessarily
translate into the requisite showing of bias sufficient to reverse a trial
court's ruling that the juror is qualified. For instance, in Linell v.
State"150 the prospective juror stated that he could disregard the fact
that he had previously been robbed and his family had been subjected
to acts of violence and could sit impartially; the trial court's decision to
hold the juror qualified was not reversible because of its more favorable
position to observe the demeanor of the juror in this capital prosecu-
tion. If a juror's answers to questioning are tentative or equivocal such
that he cannot consider the full range of punishment or follow the
court's instructions, the trial court is deemed to be in a more favorable
ting the juror to imposition of the maximum punishment).
145. In Conley v. State, 270 Ark. 886, 888, 607 S.W.2d 328, 329 (1980), for instance, the
prospective juror demonstrated a prejudice against the accused, although not personal, due to the
acquittal of another defendant accused of a similar crime. The juror was not subject to rehabilita-
tion on the basis of the responses given.
146. Dillard v. State, 20 Ark. App. 35, 39-40, 723 S.W.2d 373, 375 (1987) (involving a
juror who stated that he had had a previous "personal confrontation with" the defendant which
would bias him).
147. Walton v. State, 279 Ark. 193, 196-99, 650 S.W.2d 231, 233 (1983). Here, a juror
who had heard part of the trial testimony during a previous trial which had ended in mistrial
failed to disclose knowledge of this fact due to her intense interest in serving as a juror. The court
concluded that her deception indicated she was unqualified to sit as an impartial juror. Compare
McFarland v. State, 284 Ark. 533, 547, 684 S.W.2d 233, 242 (1985), in which the juror's tardy
disclosure that she knew the victim of another crime allegedly committed by defendant did not
require exclusion since defense counsel made no inquiry as to her failure to disclose the fact in
response to questioning and the trial court had excluded a number of jurors who had admitted
knowing the victim of the crime being tried and a juror who admitted speaking with the victim at
the courthouse prior to the trial.
148. Henslee v. State, 251 Ark. 125, 471 S.W.2d 352 (1971); Fleming v. State, 284 Ark.
307, 681 S.W.2d 390 (1984). The burden of proof is placed on the party claiming actual bias by a
prospective juror. Bovee v. State, 19 Ark. App. 268, 276, 720 S.W.2d 322, 326 (1986); Linell v.
State, 283 Ark. 162, 164, 671 S.W.2d 741, 743 (1984).
149. Bovee, 19 Ark. App. at 276, 720 S.W.2d at 326; accord, Fleming v. State, 284 Ark.
307, 309, 681 S.W.2d 390, 392 (1984) (stating that actual bias must be demonstrated in order to
reverse a trial court for abuse of discretion in qualifying juror to serve).
150. 283 Ark. 162, 164, 671 S.W.2d 741, 742 (1984).
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position to determine qualification of the juror,1"' and once that deci-
sion has been made, the court may limit further questioning of the pro-
spective juror.152
In Holland v. State1 53 defense counsel made an innovative argu-
ment that jurors who had previously sat on other juries involving the
testimony of the State's key witness, an undercover narcotics officer,
had prejudged his credibility and, thus, were biased on a key issue in
the case.1 54 The court held that implied bias results only when a juror
has already served in a case involving another person charged with the
same offense and that disqualification is not required when the prior
service merely involves similar charge.155 Here, because no juror would
admit bias based on prior service in cases involving the witness, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying these jurors over
counsel's objection that they had predetermined the witness'
credibility.156
However, an admission of actual bias on the part of the juror is
not required for disqualification, as demonstrated in Fleming v. State1 57
where the prospective juror had been cross-examined by the prosecutor
in another trial, had negative feelings about the treatment accorded the
defendant/boyfriend, and whose sister was involved with the accused.
The juror had testified she had no negative feelings about the
prosecutor.
As is often typical in matters of criminal procedure, Arkansas de-
cisions concerning the trial court's exercise of discretion in qualification
of jurors do not necessarily reflect mechanical application of uniform
rules. Rather, the trial court's decision appears to rest in part on the
obvious nature of disqualification, such as in Glover v. State,1 58 in
which the trial court seated four jurors who stated that they could set
aside previous opinions of the defendant's guilt (or the quantum of
proof available at trial). In another example, Novak v. State, 15  the
151. Webster v. State, 284 Ark. 206, 208-09, 680 S.W.2d 906, 907 (1984).
152. Perry v. State, 277 Ark. 357, 377-78, 642 S.W.2d 865, 876 (1982).
153. 260 Ark. 617, 542 S.W.2d 761 (1976).
154. Id. at 618, 542 S.W.2d at 762.
155. Id. (relying on Sorrentino v. State, 214 Ark. 115, 214 S.W.2d 517 (1948)).
156. Id. at 619-20, 542 S.W.2d at 703.
157. 284 Ark. 307, 309-10, 681 S.W.2d 390, 392 (1984). The court based its holding on
Conley v. State, 270 Ark. 886, 607 S.W.2d 328 (1980) which held that a juror's candid admission
of bias was sufficient for disqualification despite his affirmation of belief that he could be a fair
and impartial juror.
158. 248 Ark. 1260, 455 S.W.2d 670 (1970).
159. 287 Ark. 271, 278, 698 S.W.2d 499, 503-04 (1985).
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Arkansas Supreme Court addressed a trial court's denial of a mistrial
after a prospective juror, a police officer, stated before the entire panel
that he was acquainted with the accused from having arrested him sev-
eral times in the past. In upholding the decision, the court noted the
defendant's unchallenged confessions to the crime.
D. Preservation of Error in Jury Selection
As is the case with most types of claims of trial error in criminal
appeals, defense counsel's failure to preserve error through timely ob-
jection dooms many claims of abuse of discretion in the jury selection
process. For instance, in Sanders v. State6" the prosecutor attempted
to use voir dire to make statements typical of opening or closing argu-
ment, but counsel's failure to timely move for mistrial or request an
admonition resulted in the issue not being preserved for appellate re-
view. 6 Similarly, in Novak v. State defense counsel's failure to re-
quest a timely admonition resulted in waiver of a potentially prejudicial
error. In that case, a police officer serving as a prospective juror gratui-
tously advised the court in the presence of the panel that he was ac-
quainted with the defendant as a result of having previously arrested
him. The Arkansas Supreme Court observed that defense counsel
would doubtlessly have been entitled to an instruction to disregard the
comment had he requested it. 62 His not doing so, however, resulted in
waiver of the error, Furthermore, Arkansas case law indicates that in
order to preserve error, an objection in this context must be specific
rather than general.168
Moreover, any necessary objection to a prejudicial remark made
before the panel must be made in a timely fashion. For example, in
Dillard v. State"" the defense counsel failed to preserve error because
he did not object to a juror's comment that he had a previous confron-
tation with the accused until after twenty-four jurors had been ex-
amined, waiving the issue as a result of the untimeliness of the action.
Similarly, in Sims v. State,'6 a case which involved a juror who had
served in a previous case involving the defendant, the defendant did not
object to the juror until almost two weeks after conviction, when he
160. 278 Ark. 420, 646 S.W.2d 14 (1983).
161. Id. at 422, 646 S.W.2d at 15.
162. 287 Ark. at 278, 698 S.W.2d at 503-04.
163. Webster v. State, 284 Ark. 206, 209, 680 S.W.2d 906, 908 (1984).
164. 20 Ark. App. 35, 40, 723 S.W.2d 373, 376 (1987).
165. 266 Ark. 922, 924-25, 587 S.W.2d 604, 605 (1979).
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filed a pro se petition requesting that the trial court set aside his con-
viction. The Arkansas Supreme Court said the elderly juror may not
have properly understood the context of the word "know"; each pro-
spective juror should have been asked if he or she knew facts about the
case or had observed the accused. The juror testified that he could not
see well enough to recognize the defendant and that when he finally
realized he did know him, he did not know who to inform about the
omission.' 66 The complaint was not timely in light of lack of definitive
evidence of prejudice to the accused's right to a fair trial.
The most important preservation rule in terms of juror qualifica-
tion is that failure of the trial court to exclude an objectionable juror
constitutes reversible error only if defense counsel exhausts the avail-
able peremptories and then objects to being forced to accept an other-
wise unacceptable juror because a strike had to be used when the trial
court failed to excuse a juror challenged for cause. 67 If the defense
fails to exhaust its peremptories or fails to object to the seating of an
unacceptable juror after peremptories have been exhausted, the trial
court's error in refusing to excuse a juror challenged for cause has not
been preserved because the defendant cannot establish that the jury
seated was, in any sense, unfair. 68
Where, however, the trial court has improperly refused to excuse
jurors who were obviously disqualified despite the trial court's attempt
at rehabilitation, and counsel objects to seating of a juror following
exhaustion of peremptories, the issue of the trial court's abuse of dis-
cretion has been properly preserved for appellate review. 16 9
CONCLUSION
It is fairly clear that control of the jury selection process in both
federal and state trial courts in Arkansas rests within the exercise of
sound discretion of the trial court. Although certain matters are fixed
by operation of statute170 or rule relating to the qualifications of a jury
166. Id. at 924, 587 S.W.2d at 605.
167. Miller v. State, 8 Ark. App. 165, 166, 649 S.W.2d 407, 407-08 (1983).
168. Conley v. State, 270 Ark. 886, 888-89, 607 S.W.2d 328, 329 (1980).
169. Bovee v. State, 19 Ark. App. 268, 276, 720 S.W.2d 322, 326 (1986).
170. For example, vision and hearing impaired persons are disqualified from jury service
under a state statute. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-31-102 (Michie 1987). This exclusion was unsuccess-
fully challenged by a deaf person summoned for jury service in Pulaski County who was accompa-
nied to court by a qualified court interpreter. After being excluded from service following an
evidentiary hearing, the excluded juror brought an action claiming violation of her rights under
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Eckstein v. Kirby,
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and the framework of the presentation, the trial court still determines
the manner in which questioning is to be presented and, most impor-
tantly, the scope and duration of voir dire examination to be accorded
the attorney at trial. Consequently, counsel approaching the criminal
trial should bear in mind the need to maintain the trial court's respect,
if not favor, so as to avoid undue curtailment of examination as an
arbitrary response to lengthy or probing voir dire by an irritated trial
judge.
Additionally, counsel must be acquainted with both the limits of
discretion accorded the trial court and the proper mode of preserving
error in jury selection matters in order to deal with those situations in
which the trial court's interest in expediting the proceedings interferes
with a thorough and necessary examination of prospective jurors, their
biases, and attitudes.
Finally, quite apart from the legal aspects of the conduct of the
examination and selection process, counsel must develop a strategy for
the wise use of time allotted both to identify potential sources of bias
requiring exclusion of jurors upon challenge and in discerning informa-
tion or attitudes which will guide counsel in the exercise of peremptory
challenge. In this latter respect, both prosecutors and defense counsel
should bear in mind the observation of the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Cochran v. State"' in which the court pointed out that an attorney
decides: "'whether to use a peremptory challenge not so much on what
a venireman may say, but on how he says it.' ",172 The court's insight
suggests the difference between the conduct of voir dire as a matter of
452 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D. Ark. 1978). Although she lost this challenge, recent adoption of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (Title 11, addressing public services),
suggests that her claim might fare far better in the future. See Michael B. Goldas, Due Process,
The Deaf and Blind as Jurors, 17 N~w ENG. L. REV. 119, 134-44 (1981) (discussing the Eck-
stein decision at length).
The diverse nature of litigation focusing on jury selection and exclusion is demonstrated by
Eckstein and decisions involving challenges brought by convicted defendants involving service of
hearing-impaired jurors. In State v. Spivey, 700 S.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Mo. 1985)(en banc), for
instance, the court rejected the claim made by the defense that exclusion of a hearing-impaired
juror violated his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. On the other
hand, in United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1987), the court rejected the claim
that the trial court's refusal to exclude a hearing-impaired juror who required assistance of an
interpreter during deliberations constituted a violation of the defendant's right to a fair trial.
171. 256 Ark. 99, 505 S.W.2d 520 (1974).
172. Id. at 100A, 505 S.W.2d at 521, quoted with approval in Smith v. State, 33 Ark. App.
52, 53, 800 S.W.2d 440, 441 (1990).
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form and elevation of the process into an element in the art of
lawyering.

